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The Institutional Foundations of “Labor Conventions” 
in France between the Wars 
Claude Didry ∗ 
Abstract: »Die institutionellen Grundlagen der „Konventionen der Arbeit” in 
Frankreich zwischen den Weltkriegen«. In interwar France, the development of 
labor law and social insurances has led to a familiarization of the actors with 
the employment contract. It has given a larger scope to the labor conventions 
by enabling the integration of the isolated workers (working at home) in the 
population of the employees. Thus, labor law can be seen as an “investment in 
forms” defining labor above the split between industrial establishment and 
small firms industries. It explains why the vanguard of the movement was not 
the workers of the big rationalized plants, but the high skilled workers of the 
armament industries and the Parisian seamstresses. The negotiation addressed 
then firstly the classification of the working population in order to complete 
the ongoing unification of the wage earners. 
Keywords: Labor, labor conventions, investment in forms, employment con-
tract, collective agreement, Front Populaire. 
1.  Introduction 
One current opinion sees the interwar period as a time of work rationalization 
(Moutet 1995). Rationalization first appeared as a kind of “great national 
cause,” supported by the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) in the de-
bates of the national economic council, and then later as a movement to reduce 
employment effected by the crisis. The great strikes in May and June 1936, 
accompanying the election of the Popular Front (Front Populaire) majority in 
the French deputy chamber, could therefore be seen as the result of the contra-
dictions of this rationalization, contributing to the creation of large masses of 
workers threatened by unemployment (Boyer 1986). However, this social 
movement shows that the first strikes took place in those sectors which were 
least affected by rationalization, including armaments production and the aero-
nautics sector, which were centers of small-series production with a significant 
amount of innovation. Collective bargaining in this sector could well be seen as 
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the drawing up of specific “labour conventions,” marked by “artisan-type” 
work (Didry and Salais 1993). 
Thus, rationalization’s influence on the strikes of the Popular Front may not 
be as clear as is commonly held in accepted social history, where the formation 
of large masses of workers is taken as a decisive factor. One could certainly 
consider the launching of these first strikes in the less rationalized sectors as a 
form of resistance to rationalization based on the very nature of the work in-
volved. Without denying the importance of this dimension of resistance,1 it 
should be noted that the interwar period was also marked by important devel-
opments in labor law. These years were indeed marked by the interventionist 
legacy of the war economy, the 1919 adoption of the first law on collective 
bargaining agreements, and another law on working hours. In addition, the last 
two books of the Labor Code (Code du travail) were adopted in 1927. Finally, 
a social insurance system was created in 1928. How should this important 
legislative activity be analyzed in a context marked by a significant decline in 
social conflict and collective bargaining and prior to the “social explosion” of 
the great strikes of the Popular Front? Did it meet the need for increased pro-
tection of workers in the face of an increasingly difficult work organization? 
Might we not also see in this a wider “investment in forms”2 enabling a real 
definition of “work,” “labor,” or “employment”3 in the most varied forms of 
productive activity, in particular that of the “individualized worker” whose 
condition up to that point had varied from self-employment to that of a wage 
earner? Would that explain the dynamism of the less rationalized armaments 
and aeronautics industries in the metallurgy sector as well as in the Parisian 
garment industry? 
By implementing the new “form” of the “employment contract” (contrat de 
travail) in the most varied situations, in both industrial and commercial estab-
lishments as well as in the case of “isolated” workers working at home, World 
War I and the social legislation of the 1920s contributed to defining a specific 
area of uncertainty concerning “work” in relation to a purely commercial un-
certainty related to the product’s ability to find a buyer. The now common 
reference to an “employment contract” is used to link together all those who 
could be designated as “employees” of an “employer,” that is to say, of the 
management of a more or less distant “firm.” In this sense, it reinforces the 
“distinction between production and trade” (Salais 1994, 376), to arrive at an 
empirical definition of the “firm” as “a collective mechanism which, by pro-
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ducing a product, prepares the test of selling it to an external buyer, a condition 
of its success” (Salais 1994, 380, emphasis in original). How then do these 
developments furnish a partial explanation of the scope of this great social 
movement which started in 1936 in that part of the productive world which was 
rather far from that of large rationalized companies? On the basis of this first 
extension of the employment contract in the workforce, it is possible to see 
how collective agreements “by branch” played a role in “writing” the various 
“labor conventions” that emerged. 
2.  State-Regulated Work Organization during the War 
The first decade of the twentieth century was marked by a major legal upheav-
al, based on a reinterpretation of the law beginning with “labor” (le travail). 
The starting point of the legislative reflection leading to this employment con-
tract was a criticism the Civil Code (Code civil), a legacy of the Revolution, as 
the elementary grammar of social interactions in a society of free men. It was 
considered to be an expression of “natural law” which protected the freedom of 
individuals in their various interactions by reducing them to a contract on the 
basis of a civil status derived from a patriarchal family architecture. Its goal in 
the field of productive activities was thus to limit the risk of abuses arising 
from “domestic service” (domesticité) seen as an attack on individual freedom 
(Cottereau 2002). The solution found to guarantee a “real renting contract” (vrai 
louage) has been a legislation on the “jobs contract” (louage d’ouvrage) centered 
on the job, i.e. the result of the productive activity ordered by a merchant. By 
starting with “labor” as the object of the transaction, the promoters of “labor 
law,” in the form of a “Labor Code” or a draft bill on “employment contracts,” 
intended to undermine the involved complex architecture inherited from the 
Revolution. Instead of a “jobs contract” (louage d’ouvrage) – establishing the 
rights of skilled workers to organize their own activity (a “jobs and industrial 
contract” (louage d’ouvrage et d’industrie) based on payment by the job) in-
volving eventually the hiring of unskilled workers on a “service contract” 
(louage de services) – and a variety of contracts (commissions, licences) appli-
cable to employees and engineers, the “employment contract” (contrat de trav-
ail) is presented as a common frame of reference for workers linked to the 
same “employer.” This contract describes the individual relationship that de-
velops between all those involved in the same productive activity and the per-
son who is designated as the “employer.” This contract undermined “labour 
sub-contracting” (marchandage), another name for the louage d’ouvrage et 
d’industrie, and was defined by its general scope, going beyond the world of 
the worker by integrating employees, foremen, technicians and engineers. 
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2.1  Theoretical Preamble 
It implies seeing law not only as a public decision imposing new obligations on 
the citizens, but as a reference or a framework for the actors resulting of collec-
tive discussions centered on the Parliament which became essential in the Third 
Republic. If law has to be seen as a “framework” for the social interactions, it 
also implies to enter the “institutional matrix” which remains a “black box” 
governed by pressure groups, according to the New Historical Institutionalism 
in the version of North (1991). It justifies analyzing the elaboration of law as a 
specific “world of production” (Storper and Salais 1997), in which several 
“possible worlds of law” compete and contribute to the compromise that repre-
sent new laws adopted by the vote of the Parliament.4 
It raises the need to consider the tensions of what Max Weber (1978) pre-
sents as the “formal rationalization” of law resulting from the permanent at-
tempt of the jurists to systematize the juridical rules, i.e. based on what he 
names a “juridical point of view.” In the case of France, one century after the 
Revolution, it corresponds to the dominant “possible world of law” (at that 
time) aimed at conceiving law deductively from the basic rights of the “free 
men” instituted as such by the civil code, i.e. as householders responsible for 
the family’s minors (women and children). This possible world echoing to the 
political liberal right wing is challenged by a “material rationalization” based 
on the attempt to maintain the “dignity” of men threatened by industry, with 
what was called at that time the “industrial legislation” limited to industrial 
establishment. This possible world also aims (as “rationalization”) at a system-
atic regulation, based on the defense of the society, the race or the divine nature 
of man as God’s creature, and tends to be marginalized by the first one (the 
world of the “pure jurists”). In this tension between “formal” and “material” 
rationalizations, the “labor code” is a way to lose the rationalization and can be 
seen as such as a trend towards an irrational law (a third possible world of law 
based on what Weber calls the “Kadi Justiz”). It starts from an emerging social 
reality, work, seen by socialist politicians (e.g. deputies in the chamber) and 
sociologists (e.g. Durkheim), as a principle of society’s organization. Law is 
seen here as a tool to define this emerging reality, through its mobilization by 
the actors (namely the “employee,” i.e. the one who conceives herself as such, 
and the “employer”) and the answer of the judge. It leads to precise the emerg-
ing rights of the individuals involved in this “legal situation,” which evokes 
what Simon Deakin presents in this HSR Special Issue as “reflexive law.” In 
my view, this third possible world of law echoes to the political impetus com-
ing from the socialist deputies (such as Arthur Groussier who proposed in 1898 
a first version of a “labor code” in the Chamber or Alexandre Millerand (future 
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minister for trade and industry)). It becomes the basis of the successful com-
promise proved by the vote of the Book 1 of the Labor Code in 1910, and by 
the vote of the law on collective agreements (“convention collective”) in 1919.  
Thus, law has to be conceived as a “juridical device,” a public “investment 
in form” not directly derived from the “industrial world” as in Thévenot’s view 
(Thévenot 1984), but from the more general (and deliberately vague) concept 
of work/labor. It becomes then an institution understood as a reference for the 
actors in their interactions, enabling these actors to qualify their situation as 
“work/labor.” It leads to a distinction between institutions and economic con-
ventions (Bessy 2012; Diaz-Bone 2012): institutions being taken progressively 
by the economic actors themselves as categories enabling to precise the “com-
mon knowledge” of the conventions they participate in. But the dynamics of 
legal institutions, though distinct from the economic conventions, are entangled 
within them. New laws, even in the form of draft legislation, are bringing new 
categories, i.e. new ways of conceiving the situations in which they participate, 
for the actors. In 1914, the “employment contract” had recently entered the 
legal language since 1910, with an article in the Labor Code which merely took 
the former duality of the “service contract” and the “job contract” as two forms 
of compensation. The war made the organization of uninterrupted production to 
feed the front a necessity, and led the state to strengthen this new vision of 
labor relations through the first generalization of the employment contract.5 
Instead of conceiving industrial facilities as the aggregation of small teams 
placed under the authority of a job taker, the employment contract, as the 
common status of those who work for the same employer, enabled to see the 
plants to be seen as groups mixing workers, foremen, and engineers. This gen-
eralization occurred first in the armament industry and it also affected home 
seamstresses involved in the production of uniforms. 
2.2  The Organization of a War Economy and the “Millerand 
Decrees”  
The industrial mobilization which necessarily flowed from the prospect of a 
protracted conflict functioned under the auspices of the undersecretary of State 
for armaments, Albert Thomas, on the basis of the decrees of 10 August 1899, 
which fixed the work conditions to which public procurement contractors agree 
to abide, severely limiting subcontracting and prohibiting marchandage (labor 
sub-contracting), i.e. the former civilian “job contract.” These decrees issued 
                                                             
5  David Stark suggests a similar process in the U.S. economy at the time of World War I: “In 
order to achieve its goal of uninterrupted production the state was forced to take steps to 
reduce the threat of strikes, lockouts, slowdowns and other forms of industrial disruption” 
(Stark 1980, 107). In particular, these included challenging the power of skilled workers 
(“craftsmen”) over the organization of production. 
HSR 40 (2015) 1  │  47 
by Alexandre Millerand, then Minister of Trade and Industry, had hitherto been 
barely enforced. But they took on new importance with the war through the 
unprecedented weight of public spending under the leadership of Millerand, 
who had become Minister of War, and of his undersecretary of State, Thomas. 
The undersecretary of State for armaments thus worked for the organization of 
arbitration procedures in the armament industries. It was in this context that the 
joint committees, such as the Joint Commission of the Seine, were created and 
put in charge of reviewing the implementation of the ministerial decisions on 
rates.6 The activity of these commissions was relayed into the industrial estab-
lishments by the “shop stewards” (délégués d’atelier). 
In 1917, the decision of the Commission of the Seine to regulate wages for 
war production in the Paris region went even further. It no longer limited itself 
only to noting the average conditions; it enforced compliance to a specific form 
of compensation, presented as most likely to generate the workers’ maximum 
efforts. By such a decision, the State tended to interfere directly in employer 
policies, and even create new ones. This decision cut wages into three elements. 
The first wage element was the salaire affutage, that is, those wages guaranteed 
to the worker based on his hours present at work. The second element was a 
bonus system that a worker could earn by exceeding average productivity. These 
were both hourly rates: in cases of piecework wages, the employer had to show 
that the wages corresponded to the minimum hourly rate specified by ministerial 
decision. A third element was added to the first two: a cost of living bonus, calcu-
lated on the basis of the cost of living observed in different constituencies. Work-
ing conditions were defined on the basis of the earnings of an individual worker, 
seriously undermining the model of a “specialist” surrounded by a group of 
workers who he paid out of what he received for the items produced in a system 
which looked very much like a marchandage (labor sub-contracting). Workers 
were individually linked to the management of the institution where they worked 
based on what looked like an “employment contract” even if the male workforce 
consisted of soldiers assigned to their jobs. 
2.3  The Case of Home Seamstresses  
World War I also changed the situation for those workers who were at the heart 
of the “sweating system,” supplying the clothing departments in department 
stores: the home seamstresses. The midinettes, as they were then called – i.e. in 
English, the working girls – were also involved in the war economy through the 
production of uniforms. But they remained free to strike, and through their 
collective actions, precipitated the adoption of the much-discussed law institut-
ing a minimum wage in the garment industry. 
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The act of 10 July 1915 set up two bodies in every region and garment spe-
cialty to establish minimum working conditions. The first body, the wages 
committee, determined the minimum hourly wage. A second body, the profes-
sional expertise committee, determined the production time for items given to 
home workers in order to establish a rate on the basis of the initial hourly wage 
which would be applicable to home work. The act also provided that “any 
manufacturer, contractor or intermediary, who has the above referred work 
done at home, must notify the labor inspector and keep a record showing the 
name and address of each worker thus occupied” (article 33a). The worker then 
had to fill out a notebook indicating the nature of the work performed. A law of 
11 June 1917, supplementing that of 1915, organized the “Saturday afternoon 
rest” in the garment industry. 
Both laws represented a revolution in an occupation hitherto subjected to a 
system of multi-stage sub-contracting. The main contractor was now clearly 
identified and held responsible for the payment of wages, making him an “em-
ployer.” Salaries were no longer piece work wages, but were now paid by the 
hour. In short, the working girls had entered the age of the wage earner. 
In the context of a war economy, the State played a major role in introduc-
ing a global view of labor into the armaments industry, organizing the coopera-
tion of workers on the basis of their skills. Decisions by the mixed commis-
sions of conciliation and arbitration provided the basis for collective 
negotiations undertaken to prepare the return to peace, seen as a “return to 
normality,” though World War I had led to a major change in the definition of 
labor. We see here a process going beyond an economic causality, in which the 
need for an uninterrupted production has been answered through the implemen-
tation of the employment contract as a relevant legal reference in the situation. 
But around this core, dominated by this orientation towards the importance of a 
“technological” product such as armaments, a more general process of discov-
ery of work was underway in a productive world more marked by “interperson-
al” and “market” dimensions as in the case of the home-based seamstresses.7 
3.  The Employment Contract in the Postwar World 
Peace marked a return to a longer-term process in the discovery of the em-
ployment contract which, as before the war, was advanced by social welfare 
legislation. This legislation introduced a relatively unified view of work as a 
period of life by regulating its duration, leading to a clarification of the rela-
tionship with an employer in the case of social protection in work accidents and 
in social insurance. It shows how the development of new legal institutions 
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impacted the existing ones, not only in the lawyers’ sphere, but also in their 
mobilization by the actors in their current interactions; social welfare legisla-
tion intensified the reference to the employment contract, in order to determine 
who was submitted to the newly created obligations in terms of working time 
or social insurance coverage.  
3.1  Working Hours 
During the nineteenth century, legislation on working hours was part of a sys-
tem of regulations that responded to concerns which aimed at protecting those 
social groups seen as the most vulnerable to the physical and moral degrada-
tion, resulting from excessive working time. The act of 28 March 1841 prohib-
ited the employment of children, and the act of 2 November 1892 regulated 
women and children’s working time in industrial facilities. However, these 
regulations remained outside of productive activities centered on the “job,” 
which fixed payment, and which resorted to frequent use of “helpers” hired by 
the most skilled workers. Depending on the job being done, with the use of 
casual workers as well as of their family members, this largely limited man-
agement’s control over child labor and over working hours were themselves 
secondary for a working population trying to earn enough. 
With the emergence of the employment contract, the regulation of working 
time took on a specific importance, helping define this strange object of the 
transaction, which is tied to the employment contract, the work itself. Work 
appears as a specific activity in the worker’s life in isolation from family and 
leisure activities. Union demands for the eight-hour day were thus based on a 
broader vision of the worker’s life, linking together eight hours of labor to eight 
hours of personal activities (family, leisure) and eight hours of rest. 
The act of 23 April 1919 establishing the eight-hour day was a turning point 
whose success owed a great deal to the employment contract. This helps ex-
plain why “basically, the 1919 law on the eight-hour day seems to have been 
the first law on working time to have been more or less respected” (Fridenson 
2004, 67). The law helped to define work as having a specific duration, by 
placing it in a specific area appearing in the amended article 6 of Book 2 of the 
Labor Code, the establishment:  
In industrial or commercial establishments and their dependencies of any kind, 
whether public or private, secular or religious, and even if they have the char-
acter of a professional educational or charitable institution, the real working 
hours of workers or employees of one or the other sex and any age may not 
exceed eight hours per day, forty-eight in the week, or an equivalent limitation 
established over a period of time other than the week.  
But while the length of time appeared as a central element in the definition of 
work, the working hours resulting from this regulation led to the discovery of a 
new, and in some ways unique, foundation as compared to the logic of jobs and 
crafts: that of the “branch” or “industry.” Indeed, it was expected that the im-
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plementation of the law would result in “government regulations,” “determin-
ing by occupation, industry, trade or occupational category, for the whole coun-
try or a region, the limits and conditions of the preceding article” (article 7, 
amended, of title 1, book 2 of the Labor Code). Whether we talk about the 
branch, occupation, industry or occupational category, the important thing here 
is the conception of the establishment within larger entities that emerges from a 
vision of the economy as a whole, through the economic classifications on 
which the census was based. It is at this level that employers and workers’ organ-
izations would have to be consulted in the development of these regulations. 
While the “occupation” or the “industry” seems to be the appropriate levels 
of negotiation, it is because we can see the beginnings of a real interrogation of 
the relationship between working time and wage, which, without going as far 
as a time/wages equivalency, opens up an inquiry into the organization of 
work. Metallurgy was the vanguard in the implementation of the eight-hour 
day, with a national agreement reached on 24 May 1919. This agreement fixed 
an eight hour day for 6 days, and allowed for one Saturday afternoon off per 
fortnight.8 Maintaining wages meant formalizing a time/wage equivalency 
which remained a problem for the “workers working on piece work rates, on 
sub-contracting.” For the latter, two sub-categories were presented: 
a. The time given for individual marchandage (sub-contracted labor) or for ar-
ticles measured in “time” will be reduced in principle in direct proportion to 
the reduction of working hours, the hourly rate (salaire affutage) being re-
vised in inverse proportion. 
b. In principle, labor sub-contracting in francs and the piecework rate in francs 
will not be changed automatically by the application of the eight-hour day.  
Each industrialist will have to examine the piecework rates, bonuses and labor 
sub-contracting applied in his establishment, to find to what degree the workers 
can maintain in a reduced working day the average daily production which they 
normally produced in the six months prior to the enactment of the law. 
Thus, the legislation on the eight-hour day finally contributed to the inscription 
of employment contracts in industrial and commercial “establishments.” It 
tended to reduce the marchandage to one form of compensation in a context of 
rationalization in which there were an increasing number of wage systems. But 
gradually and in various ways, the world of industrial work learned about 
time/wage equivalency. 
3.2  Occupational Accidents and Lumbermen 
Social protection legislation was also an important factor in the employment 
contract’s discovery by the actors themselves, especially by those in work 
situations outside “establishments.” Certainly, the sphere of activity of the first 
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social protection laws – the laws of 1892 on the work of women and children, 
of 1893 on health and safety, and of 1898 on work accidents – was limited to 
what the legislature had designated as “industrial establishments.” But specifi-
cally, the discussions about “labor law,” which took place at the same time, went 
along with the concerns about opening this social protection to another world. In 
the case of prewar lumbermen considered by Pigenet (1994), in order to obtain 
the benefits of the law of 1898, it was necessary to stop seeing logging as a “har-
vest” and to analyze the “cut” as a “work site” or “establishment.” Henceforth, 
the union changed its perspectives with the aim of freeing itself from being in-
volved in the organization of work, which made it appear as the “employer” of 
lumbermen the negotiated rate appearing as a sales price. From this perspective, 
in 1904, “the Federation issued a model contract for each logger, one of whose 
clauses obliged the marchand (contractor) to bear the costs and expenses result-
ing from a work accident” (Pigenet 1994, 375). But in doing so, the contract 
defined an individual contractual relationship between the marchand and individ-
ual lumberman, thus placing the “marchands” in the position of “employers.” 
After the war, based on the 1914 law extending the legislation on industrial 
accidents to agricultural activities, the question of the responsibility of contrac-
tors arose once again, this time in the case of individual legal actions brought 
by lumbermen who were accident victims. Thus, a lumberman’s work in a 
cutting section, whether or not this was known to the prime contractor, made 
the former an employee of the latter who, as an “employer,” was liable for 
damages caused by an accident, either to third parties, e.g. a forest fire trig-
gered by a lumberman, or to the lumberman himself, with the most frequent 
case being a lumberman injured by a falling tree. This led the jurist René 
Savatier to see this as the expression of an “economic and social dependence,” 
which was less the result of the exercise of an employer’s authority than it was 
to the fact that the worker “binds his workforce” to a “master,” who was re-
sponsible for these adverse consequences of work. Social laws, such as the law 
on occupational accidents, seemed to go further than the social protection they 
established, participating in the definition of an employee’s “social condition”:  
We should not think that one’s social condition can only be translated juridi-
cally into legal assistance laws; it determines a considerable number of rela-
tions, of civil, commercial or fiscal law, for which we have tried to give an in-
complete listing (see our above note, DP 1923, 1.5) (Savatier 1924, 73, 
emphasis added). 
3.3  Social Insurance 
The 12 April 1928 law on social insurance became another important source of 
employment contract jurisprudence. This foreshadowed the social security 
system launched at the French Liberation, which established “the social insur-
ance system [which] covers the risks from illness, premature disability, old age, 
and death and includes a participation in the family expenses as well as those 
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from maternity and involuntary unemployment due to lack of jobs” (art. 1). To 
secure funding for this insurance, the legislature created an obligation of affilia-
tion by “all employees of both sexes whose total annual compensation of what-
ever nature, excluding family allowances does not exceed 18,000 francs” (art. 
1§2). This affiliation would be “made in the département [regional administra-
tion] by the social insurance office who will register the insured and issue a 
personal social insurance card” (art. 1§3). It included the payment of a fee 
amounting to 10% of wages, up to a maximum of 15,000 francs, divided be-
tween the employee and the employer. Litigation resulting from the application 
of this law would be subject to a “departmental commission” headed by a jus-
tice of the peace (art. 63§1). In the first instance, litigation is brought in before 
this commission which aims at conciliation before judgment. Its decisions are 
subject to appeal before the civil court to which the justice of the peace is at-
tached, and can then be appealed to the Court of Cassation. 
The “social contribution” established by the law defined “those subject to 
paying the contribution,” that is to say all holders of an employment contract, 
and their “employers.” It is in this context that Paul Pic, a jurist from Lyon, 
theorized what, in his view, was an attempt by the judges to limit the conditions 
of access to a form of social protection, paving the way for what he considered 
to be a form of “assistanat” [systematized welfare assistance] and disputing the 
too “lenient” interpretation of the administration. His goal was to determine 
“the legal criterion for clearly differentiating the service contract (louage de 
services, employment contract), from the job contract (louage d’ouvrage) or 
the corporate contract, or the mandat salarié (commission)” (Pic 1931, 121). In 
contrast to the theory of economic dependence, which, we have seen, tends to 
unify the categories of the Civil Code, Pic advance the theory of “legal depend-
ence” or “legal subordination,” which he describes as the commonly accepted 
theory in jurisprudence “despite some hesitation,” up to the implementation of 
the law on social insurance. 
He based his view on the 6 July 1931 Bardou decision in the case of a man-
ager of a subsidiary of a commercial food company. This manager claimed that 
he was not subject to paying the contribution because he was not an employee 
insofar as his work was not subject to any hierarchical authority. He successful-
ly won his case in the decision of the Court of Cassation, which reaffirmed a 
judgment of the Civil Court of Toulouse. Paul Pic again defended this thesis in 
a case involving home workers, which was settled by three judgments in 1931. 
These decisions were related to a ribbon manufacturer from Saint Etienne 
(tribunal civil de Saint Etienne), workers working in caning chairs in the de-
partment of the Ain (tribunal civil de Belley), and garment workers working for 
a tailor (tribunal civil de Lyon). Judges decided that such home workers were 
not employees, but “loueurs d’ouvrage” (job contractors), and thus exempt 
from liability to social insurance. In 1932, decisions by the Court of Cassation 
challenged this position, considering that home workers who worked regularly 
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for a “maison” (firm) should be regarded as subject to social security contribu-
tions. This debate was decided by the legislative decree of 28 October 1935, 
extending compulsory insurance to all those French who worked for one or 
more employers, thereby giving a broad view of the employment contract 
based on the observation of an exclusive relationship between the worker and a 
certain number of employers. 
Falling within the framework of the new Labor Code, postwar “social” leg-
islation tended to generate a process of “discovery” of the employment contract 
for those working in “establishments” as well as for “isolated” workers (work-
ing at home) attached to an “establishment.” It thus supported the process of 
the “rationalization” of work and even, in the case of working time, encouraged 
it. But more than just basing the rationalization of work in “industrial worlds of 
production” (as defined by Storper and Salais 1997), this broader discovery of 
the employment contract helped define the identity of “employees” through all 
the worlds of production. In this sense, it appeared as a kind of “public invest-
ment in form.” 
4.  Collective Agreements in Situations  
The employment contract provided a unified view of the personnel of an estab-
lishment. This raises questions about how the different personnel categories are 
coordinated and interconnected in work and in social conflicts. This also leads 
to considering how the staff representatives concerned formalize these categories 
into more or less successful classifications. But this collective dynamic, which is 
pointed to by the demand for “workers’ control” of the work place, was also 
accompanied by a mobilization of “individualized workers” whose employment 
contract helped them connect to a community of workers. Thus, the Popular 
Front strikes, far from being limited only to industrial establishments starting 
from a core of highly skilled armaments workers, showed an equally pioneering, 
but now forgotten mobilization of the home-based garment workers whose 
social movements had already hit headlines during the World War I. 
4.1  The Establishment: New Centre of the Union Strategy of 
“Workers Control” 
Along with the “discovery” of the employment contract, the idea of “workers’ 
control” can be found throughout the interwar period in the policies of the 
CGT, followed by those of both the CGT and CGTU (Confédération générale 
du travail unitaire) after the 1921 split. But for the post-1921 CGT, “workers’ 
control” was only to be seen on a very broad level, as a counterpoint to its 1920 
support to rationalization. The “National Renovation Plan” presented in 1934 
confirmed this orientation, limiting workers’ control to the management of the 
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nationalized sector through a Higher Council of Nationalized Industries and 
Industrial Councils on a tripartite basis: representatives of producers, of con-
sumers, and of the national community. 
The CGTU’s policy was based on a more “rank and file” approach oriented 
towards “nuclei” rooted in the enterprise such as those in the minority motion 
presented at the CGT congress of 1920:  
The necessary recovery of French trade unionism will be the result of a reor-
ganization of our unions, establishing more direct links with workers in the 
shops, worksites, offices and fields […]. Groups of unionized workers should 
be formed in every workshop and factory, in wholesale stores and banks, 
wherever there are men under the domination of an economic minority of 
profiteers (Dehove 1937, 312). 
From 1921, the CGTU unions were reorganized around “factory committees” 
composed of representatives elected by the employees. This form of organiza-
tion and the objective of a “united action from below” in order to arrive at a 
“united class front” continued throughout the interwar period, but underwent 
significant reorientation in the 1930s. At the 1931 Congress, Alfred Costes, the 
representative of the Federation of Metalworkers, spoke of a “self-criticism”:  
What self-criticism should we make concerning the movements? The disor-
ganization and lack of preparation of strikes has long been the main weakness 
of our organization. We conducted strikes with very narrow strike committees, 
a total lack of a united front, and these strikes, which were launched based on 
the workers’ discontent but without methodical preparation and organization, 
were doomed to failure (CGTU 1931, 167-8).  
He added,  
[t]hat is the new method of our union: the struggle within the factories […]. 
Our perspectives are: the development of the struggle. But we must under-
stand that it is to the extent that the leadership of our union works inside the 
factories that we will succeed on the basis of immediate demands to apply the 
independent leadership through committees of struggle. You will immediately 
understand that this implies, as was stated by the comrade from Renault, re-
searching the typical demands, service by service, so that, once they are dis-
cussed by the workers, they will form the list of demands and the elected del-
egates will know what to say. So we have as a strategy, working factory by 
factory and industrial branch (CGTU 1931).  
This new orientation was extended in the following years, both within the 
CGTU as well as within the French Communist Party (PCF), which partly 
explains the leadership of communist organizations in the movement of 1936. 
4.2  Metalworking as a Laboratory for Collective Agreements of 
the Popular Front 
In this context, attention is focused on the metallurgical sector, and more spe-
cifically, on the armament and aeronautics industries, both of which were ex-
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panding in the face of the Nazi threat. Union actions were based on the strategy 
followed by the CGTU activists of developing roots in the factories. At the 
CGTU Congress in 1935, Doury, an activist in the aeronautics industry, pro-
vided an illuminating testimony on these practices: 
Since the beginning of the year, multiple struggles have taken place as a result 
of the work towards united action undertaken, especially at Bloch, applying 
the united front tactic. Our comrades have formed a single section comprising 
workers of all tendencies. By the end of the month, all workers in aviation, 
both in Hispano as well as at Gnome et Rhône or in Potez, have reached 
agreement (CGTU 1935, 117). 
This eye-witness account shows the importance of “methodical work,” taking 
the form of surveys, such as that conducted in early 1936 in the metallurgy 
sector of the Paris region (Saglio 1988). Thus, we see how trade union action 
went beyond the single question of wage claims to address work in its various 
aspects: its organization or job safety in connection with an analysis of the 
product. 
From this point of view, the conflict at the factory at Forges de la Marine et 
d’Homécourt in Saint-Chamond (near Saint-Etienne) appears as an example of 
this practice. This factory produced naval gun turrets which were virtually 
produced by the individual unit, and had to return to the organizational meth-
ods and forms of remuneration practiced during the war in order to meet the 
military demand. After a five-week occupation supported not only by the 
communists of the CGTU, but also by the Christians from the CFTC, an 
agreement was signed 25 November 1935 with three main points: 
a) Wages of skilled workers and others will be classified into three distinct 
categories; 
b) All hourly wages (salaires d’affutage) are raised by 20%, being deducted 
from the bonus. (When a skilled worker who, before the strike, had a base sal-
ary of 2.80 and who worked to a bonus did not make his bonus, he received 
only the hourly wage of 2.80. He will now receive 3.60); 
c) Recognition of union delegates. Management will meet with them and no 
sanctions will be taken for the exercise of their mandate (Didry and Salais 
1995, 128). 
The signing of this agreement led to the adjustment of a form of wages based 
on the Rowan system used in factories during World War I, from a classification 
of workers into the categories of “ouvrier professionnel” (skilled worker) and 
“ouvrier spécialisé” (semi-skilled worker) established at that time. Through its 
success, the conflict at Saint-Chamond became a point of reference in the journal 
of the United Federation of Metalworkers, Le Métallurgiste, at the beginning of 
1936. 
It was once again in the armaments sector that the 1 May 1936 strikes fully 
developed, leading to the employer’s mass dismissal of strikers. The movement 
expanded to other enterprises in the sector in response to the 1 May dismissals, 
particularly in the aeronautics industry starting with the occupation of the 
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Breguet factory in Le Havre on 12 May. Negotiations began at the end of May, 
leading to an agreement in the Parisian metal working industry on 12 June. The 
agreement preceded the adoption of the law on the 24th which made the 
“branch agreement” the basis for regulation of working conditions by ministe-
rial decree. In this process, the question of the classification of occupations 
became a critical challenge, first for the Parisian metal workers agreement, and 
subsequently for the law itself. Built around the figure of the “specialist,” it was 
the categories of “skilled worker” (ouvrier professionnel) and “semi-skilled 
worker” (ouvrier spécialisé) that provided the backbone of the classification: 
Article 19 – A) Definitions. 
1) It is understood that an ouvrier qualifié or an ouvrier professionnel 
(skilled worker) is a worker with a skill whose apprenticeship can be cer-
tified by a professional competence certificate, having passed the tradi-
tional professional trial tests. 
2) It is understood that an ouvrier spécialisé (semi-skilled worker) refers to 
a machine tool operator, an assembly worker, a production line worker, a 
worker in the forge, etc., whose operations do not require knowledge of a 
trade whose apprenticeship can be certified by a professional competence 
certificate.  
Given the urgency of the negotiations, the big classification system which had 
been announced did not take place in the Parisian metal industry. Minimum 
wages were presented for each of the specialties of the industry leading to an 
almost complete but relatively disorderly listing (the prevalence of “catalogue” 
logic according to Saglio 1988). Nevertheless, the negotiations laid the founda-
tion for a classification system dominated by the figure of the “professional” 
starting not from the car factories, but rather from the less rationalized arma-
ments and aeronautic sectors. In this process of classification of employees 
belonging to the same establishment, an annex signed 13 June added that an 
agreement would be negotiated for “employees, technicians, supervisors and 
engineers,” which was done on 12 July. The two agreements of the Parisian 
metal workers industry outlined a system of occupational classification which 
could cover the entire paid labor force. 
4.3  Parisian Seamstresses as a Forgotten Vanguard  
Parallel to the mobilization strategy undertaken in the armaments industry, the 
seamstresses in the cities who divided their work between the “fashion houses,” 
and home and family workshops were characterized by a fighting spirit just as 
strong as that of their male colleagues. They were not spared by the crisis in the 
early 1930s resulting in significant reductions in wages. In 1934, Elsa Triolet 
wrote a report in the communist weekly Regards entitled “The smiling indus-
try,” which was devoted to them. This was the context when a movement of 
unprecedented magnitude took place in May 1935 following a further decrease 
in wages. More than 2,000 Parisian midinettes were on strike according to 
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l’Humanité of 20 May. Victory was won on 24 May in 21 fashion houses out of 
24. The reduction in wages was cancelled, piece-work wages prohibited, and 
there was to be no disciplinary measures against those who had taken part in 
strike action. They proved the possibility of successful struggles in times of 
crisis at the CGTU Congress in September 1935 which led to the reunification 
with the CGT:  
There were many strikes in the garment industry, and you all remember the 
victory of the midinettes in the Paris region, which has developed the spirit of 
struggle of working women throughout the garment industry in our region, 
said Eugène Henaff, head of the Departmental Union of the CGTU (CGTU 
1935, 121). In l’Humanité, the midinettes were the object of renewed interest in 
1936. An article of 11 May “When working girls take to the streets,” written 
while the strikes were spreading through the aeronautics industry, returned to 
the history of their struggles. It started with an eye witness account:  
‘the strikes that we had to organize in 1917 and 1919 were only an episode in 
our struggle,’ an older working woman told me. An older woman, without a 
doubt. Indeed, contrary to what is generally believed, the midinettes are not all 
young. 
Then came the May/June 1936 strikes which preceded the election of the Popu-
lar Front majority to the Chamber and of Leon Blum to the Presidency of the 
Council.9 In the midst of these accumulating strike victories, a small article in 
the 12 June l’Humanité announced the “Victory of 10,000 midinettes” with the 
signing of a collective contract stipulating the abolition of piece-work wages 
and a wage increase of 12%. This movement was just as precocious as that of 
the metalworkers in the unfolding strike wave. The midinettes have their place 
in the workers vanguard which crystallized around the figure of the “métallo” 
(metal worker) (Noiriel 1986). The collective agreement “governing relations 
between dressmaking employers and their workers in the departments of the 
Seine and of Seine-et-Oise” was signed on 10 June, two days before the agree-
ment of the Parisian metal workers. This agreement defined the work of seam-
stresses as “all work requiring one or more fittings, on mannequin or a client, is 
considered as dressmaking and is regulated by this contract” and classified the 
work as “only the following categories will be maintained: first hands, skilled 
second hands, beginner second hand, small hands, first and second year appren-
tices.” It also aimed at regulating the working conditions of workers and home 
workers:  
In those fashion houses utilizing home labor, such workers should benefit 
from social laws in the same way as workers employed inside the fashion 
house itself: the estimate of the hourly basis of work, social insurance, family 
allowances. 
                                                             
9  Title of the head of government of the Third Republic, equivalent to “Prime Minister.” 
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Paid leave. – For paid leave, a compensation fund will be created in the sew-
ing industry in accordance with legal provisions. 
Union delegates. – Homeworkers are entitled to have their workers’ delegates 
on the basis of two delegates per 10 or fraction of 10. 
Certificate. – Work certificates for all those who work alone, with their spouse 
or a family member, will only provide, as indicated by the labor code, the 
names, professional qualifications, the dates of entry and release from the 
fashion house. 
Any certificate, for men or women workers subject to, or who should be sub-
ject to, social insurance, which refers to the qualifications of “jobber” (façon-
nier), “artisan,” or which refers to “taking custom work” (prenant du travail à 
façon) will not be legally valid. 
Control of working hours. – Effective control will be exercised in garment in-
dustries utilizing home labor, especially in regard to working hours and over-
time. 
The garment industry included other agreements such as the agreement of the 
“Paris regional wholesale industry in collars, cuffs and shirt fronts”10 where 
there was a series of articles concerning home-work and “entrepreneurs”11 or 
that of the “production of raincoats and rubberized clothing in the Seine.”12 The 
contracts aimed at worker sub-contracting and working from home, but without 
deciding on its outright suppression (Machu 2011, 447). From that point on, the 
aim was to expose the “false artisans” by submitting this form of production to 
the social benefits of the Popular Front such as the forty-hour work week and 
paid holidays. 
5.  Conclusion: A New “Idea of Work”? 
Taking shape in the late 1930s, this new general context of the employment 
contract and, in its wake, of labor law in a broad sense,13 it became possible for 
the actors themselves to challenge the classification of “individualized” work-
ers as “artisans” negotiating their activity in a “market” as seen in the case of 
home-based garment workers and later in the precision lathe cutters of the Arve 
Valley (Didry 1998). In other words, activities that previously fell within the 
realm of trade were now brought into participation in production prior to the 
                                                             
10  Signed on 17 November 1936. 
11  “Article 41. From the date of signing the present contract and before issuing any new work, 
the employer shall individually notify all his entrepreneurs by registered letter with ac-
knowledgment of receipt that all work accepted by the latter, from the receipt of this no-
tice, will include a commitment from him to apply the rates specified in this contract to all 
their home workers.” 
12  Signed on 17 September 1936. 
13  That is, integrating the collective agreements. 
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“market test” of the capacity of the finished product to find a social utility 
through exchange (Salais 1994). 
This suggests looking at labor law from a point of view which is distinct 
from that found in current social history: that is to say, assimilating this right of 
workers to protection against abuses of “naturalized” wage labor. Its develop-
ment helps establish this “division” between production and trade which, for 
Salais (1994, 375), is the basis of an analysis of “labor conventions.” In this 
sense, it continues the identification of a “conception of work,”14 which is 
found in embryo in the questions raised by the establishment of social protec-
tion legislation and through the investigations made by trade unionists. Indeed, 
it is on the basis of this “idea of work” that the dimension of the market was 
discarded in 1848 by the criticism of the “marchandage” as “labor sub-
contracting,” distinguishing the specific form this “idea” took in France as a 
common good from the forms Biernacki (1995) highlights in the English case 
(where work remained linked to the market transaction) and the German 
(where work was related to the exploitation of “labor power” in a factory). 
The “idea of work” that tends to support the development of labor law in the 
1930s starts first of all from the “establishment” to which the “isolated” work-
ers (working from home) will be attached: a unity of place and time leading to 
the conception of “labor conventions” on this basis. This develops according to 
the conceptions of the actors and the work they experiment in “conventions”, 
and through which, by coordinating with others in what they identify as a 
common situation, they arrive at a “common context of interpretation” (Salais, 
1994). In the case of the Paris region, for example, labor law had become an 
important institutional resource in establishing this “splendor of the Paris re-
gion” (Storper and Salais 1997), which crystallized around a creative dynamic 
close to the “world of immaterial production.” This was the case for both the 
Paris metallurgical industry, marked by a significant movement of innovation 
especially in aeronautics, and the garment industry in its relationship to fashion 
designers. Labor law has been the base for the renewing of coordination in the 
establishment by overcoming the barrier between workers and engineers. It 
paved the way to innovative processes by a coordination which is not simply 
hierarchical but implies also collaborations in the construction of prototypes 
which evokes the heterarchy as analyzed by Stark (2009).  
But the case of the “Parisian splendor” also shows that this consistency can 
be threatened by the decomposition of the very conception of work, as suggest-
ed by the production of the Sentier neighborhood based on low-cost copies of 
the models of the great fashion designers, going as far as the use of clandestine 
sweatshops. This comes from the fact that labor law, as an institution, contrib-
utes to the clarification of the contours of “real worlds of production,” in so far 
                                                             
14  “Isn’t the distinction between production and trade the basis of such a division? Isn’t the 
very conception of “work” in some way the result?” (Salais 1994, 376, emphasis added).  
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as the actors themselves see in it the relevance to their own work situations. In 
this sense, such an institution is characterized less by a constructive dimension 
– somehow realizing the “conception of work” by its very existence – than by 
its “constitutive” dimension,15 i.e. as a fulcrum for strengthening the consisten-
cy of a common world which the actors, and in first place the workers, experi-
ment – or not – in their work. 
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